The paper aims to unfold the «internal» content of Gettier’s argument as a skeptical argument against knowledge in terms of answering the question: «why he could be right when he says what he says». Our initial hypothesis is that E. Gettier does not say anything about the «accidentality of the fact that Smith has 10 coins in his pocket», but he uses the words «entailment» and «deduction», which substantiates the «truth of the conclusion», and on the basis of which he (...) attributes «knowledge» to Smith. The article comes out at a certain time, E. Gettier uses the rhetoric of necessary and sufficient conditions, with regard to justification an analogue of the closure principle is given, there are exactly two examples – all this lead to the assumption that E. Gettier’s «justification» in the form he speaks about it in the staging part of the article – is a logical relationship between beliefs that are interconnected by the relationship of entailment and are fixed in the same way in the person’s belief system. Much of the evidence on pages two and three is an illustration of why this «logical interpretation» of reasoning doesn’t work. Contrary to most popular points of view, E. Gettier managed to show only that the implementation of formal relations between beliefs does not allow one to get to «knowledge» in the form in which he defines it. In particular, such a reading makes it possible to block various attempts to propose a «fourth condition». It must meet the task set – to restore confidence that the fulfillment of the formal relations between beliefs can help to get to «knowledge». However, within the framework of the linguistic turn paradigm, in which E. Gettier works, this is impossible, because in general, it simply lacks adequate means of discussing the persuasiveness of the inference. In this sense, «knowledge» is, by definition, a fuzzy concept that brings us back to «classical notions» in which the persuasiveness of an argument implies not only validity, but also soundness, relevance, and usefulness. (shrink)

The paper aims to make а fair supplement to the concept of "metaphysics of relations" (bу М. Esfeld) with а coгrect coгresponding interpretation of the dispositional natшe of characteristics within Е. J. Lowe's ontology. А reasoning from science to philosophy leads М. Esfeld to the conclusion that "quantum entanglement understood in terms of non-separability of states speaks for the metaphysics of relations that denies the presence of intrinsic characteristics of the related systems". The same naturalistic argument provides rationale for the (...) Е. J. Lowe's claim that "the attribution of а characteristics to а given kind could bе metaphysically contingent" for "the laws of nature can bе exactly what they are revealed to us, only because there are no other substantial kinds that could instantiate objects". As а heuristics for the intentional interpretation ofE. J. Lowe's dispositionalism we deal with the requirements of "time-relativeness" and "relevance to causality" from W. Malzkorn's list of criteria of satisfactory representation of dispositions. (shrink)

The paper aims to answer the question: «How does an electron exist at the beginning of the 21st century?» from the point of view of the general logic of the philosophy of science discourse, taking into account con­temporary philosophical concepts that explain what an «electron» is, and in what sense we could talk about the «existence» of such objects in the first quarter of the 21st century. A good concept of the existence of an object postulated by a successful scientific (...) theory should at least take into account two contexts of proper philosophical reasoning – reasoning «from science», grasping the questions of the philosophical and meth­odological justification of knowledge at the level of certain «standards of rationality» that correspond to the chosen theory, and reasoning «from metaphysics», which, in the appropriate context, interpret «elec­tron» as an element of objective reality, as if the electron of scientists «actually» existed. Our thesis is that by choosing as the main elements of the concept the Dennettian ontology of patterns project and the E.J. Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian categorical ontology project, we will be able to block the problem of pessimis­tic meta-induction (H. Putnam, L. Laudan, etc.). The electron exists as a pattern that we extract from the whole set of empirical data associated with the theoretical entity «electron», whose «real definition» right now is given by the Standard Model and the accompanying concepts from quantum mechanics. In the course of the scientific revolution, the electron, as a pattern, does not disappear anywhere, since parts of the «real definitions» of the patterns of the old «paradigm», those that can be retrospectively interpreted and functionally meaningfully coupled with the new one, will be asserted within the «real definitions» of the new patterns, which indicates on the existence of a relationship of «essential dependence» between the «old» and the «new» patterns. (shrink)

The paper aims to show how in practice the requirement to maintain the coherence of the system of beliefs and the corresponding behavior of «spontaneous beliefs» within the concept of empirical knowledge by L. Bonjour can be correlated. The main example considered is P. Kosso’s arguments about the reliability of Thucydides’ «History» connected with the idea of possibility of justification restricted to a single source of evidence. As a heuristics we deal with the problem of how to establish the contextual (...) dependence of inference and, in general, of the structure of the justification of knowledge within the given situation. First, it is possible to extend L. Bonjour’s concept with the idea of the nonmonotonic nature of justification and coherence of the original system of beliefs. Such a step, in particular, will make it possible to abandon the need for the argument «from meta-justification». Second, the interpretation of «spontaneous beliefs», their justification and facts fixing whether these beliefs violate the coherence of the original system or not, as patterns (in the sense of the fundamental concept of existence by D. Ross) makes it possible (for example, due to the exact understanding of «interpretative perspective» and «functional role» of the projection) to meaningfully interpret the «context dependence» in each particular case. (shrink)

Jonathan Lowe believes that metaphysics should regain its central place in philosophy. It is an autonomous philosophical discipline, which task is to outline the realm of what is really possible by defining a system of fundamental ontological categories under which everything that exists falls, and relations of ontological dependence in which objects of various ontological categories are related to each other. Metaphysical categories are what gives meaning to our experience, however, unlike I. Kant, they are not the result of a (...) priori constraints – on the contrary, they are subject to revision in the face of experience. The question of why there is something in the world rather than nothing, is solved with a non-Wittgensteinian understanding of what the world is (world is the sum of all existing objects because world as “the totality of facts” lacks determinate identity-conditions), as well as an understanding that universals must be actually instantiated in particulars. Far from being an easy textbook in the proper sense, this book is a brilliant example of the return of Aristotle to modern metaphysics.Reflections on the book: Lowe E. J. The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time. Clarendon Press, 1998. (shrink)

Derek Turner believes that a proper interpretation of Arthur Fine’s natural ontological attitude can help to reveal the nature of the difference between «historical» (geology, archeology, forensics) and «empirical» (physics, chemistry) sciences. From his point of view, the apparent asymmetry between these sciences is a consequence of different understanding of the possibilities to «manipulate» the objects of study and the role played by background theories. In our opinion, Turner’s concept is a good example of how profound and inviting the instrumentalistic (...) concept of science could be. First, it is «reflexive» in the sense that it constrained other instrumentalist theories (B. Fraassen’s constructive empiricism deeply flawed). And secondly, it is «constructive» – the emphasis that «the strength of arguments for or against scientific realism can vary depending on the scientific context» quite unexpectedly leads to the fact that «ideographic / nomothetic division is not very helpful», and to the fact that «epistemic disadvantage, but the same epistemic status». Reflections on the book: Turner D. Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate. Cambridge University Press, 2007. (shrink)